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The analysis and forecast we presented in "The U.S. 
Economy in 1980" (earlier in this issue) were based on 
a methodology that took into account how consumer 
and business demands, production, wages and prices, 
and government economic policies responded to the oil-
price shock. In this paper we describe this methodology 
in more technical detail. Specifically, we describe how 
we measured the impact of the oil-price shock on the 
economy in 1979 and on the outlook for 1980. 
Our investigation resulted in three main obser-
vations. First, the oil-price shock was a major cause of 
the 1979 forecast errors. Second, actual monetary and 
fiscal policies in 1979 were tighter than historical 
relationships would imply, thus contributing to forecast 
errors in 1979 and to more pessimistic output forecasts 
for 1980. Third, some fundamental economic relation-
ships underlying the structure of our model appear to 
have changed during the course of 1979. 
The experiment we performed consisted of making 
and comparing three forecasts (see Table 1). We first 
used data through the fourth quarter of 1978 to generate 
a forecast, referred to as Fl, for major economic 
variables over 1979 and 1980. We then used these data 
and a measure of actual oil prices through the first three 
quarters of 1979 to generate a second forecast of major 
variables, F2, a forecast we might have made at the end 
of 1978 had we known exactly what oil prices would be 
in 1979. Comparing the two forecasts allowed us to 
identify the effects of the oil-price shock—the differ-
ences between forecast and actual oil prices — on the 
outlook for the economy over each quarter of 1979 and 
1980. Finally, we generated forecast F3, our model's 
best forecast for the fourth quarter of 1979 and all of 
1980, by reestimating the model using complete infor-
Table 1 
Forecasts for Estimating 
the Effects of the Oil-Price Shock 
Forecast Quarterly Data Period Estimation Period 
F1 1 957:1 through 1978:4 1 958:2 through 1978:4 
F2 1 957:1 through 1978:4 1 958:2 through 1978:4 
plus actual oil prices in 
1979:1,2,3 
F3 1957:1 through 1979:3 1958:2 through 1979:3 
plus actual interest 
rates in 1979:4 
mation through the third quarter of 1979 (the most 
recent information then available) plus fourth-quarter 
information on interest rates. 
The Vector Autoregression Model 
Our method employs a quarterly vector autoregression 
(VAR) model for the national economy which gives 
prominence to the role of energy prices. As Sargent 
(1979) points out, VAR is a statistical tool, not based 
on economic theory, which can be successfully em-
ployed as a forecasting device.
1 The VAR model 
forecasts exclusively on the basis of the historical 
behavior of the variables over the sample period. 
1 The restrictions on the model we used were generated using statistical 
techniques developed in Litterman 1979. Sargent 1979, pp. 11-13, describes 
the role of these sorts of restrictions in using VARs for forecasting. 
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divided into two classes: those assumed to be central in 
driving other variables in the system and those respond-
ing primarily to their own pasts and to the pasts of the 
driving variables. The four driving variables in our 
system are: 
1. the NIA federal government deficit 
2. the money supply, M2 
3. the 4- to 6-month commercial paper rate 
4. the energy items subindex of the consumer 
price index (energy CPI) 
The first three of these driving variables are determined 
to a large extent by monetary and fiscal policies. The 
responding variables include the real GNP demand 
components: 
• 5. consumption (consumer expenditures for non-
durables and services) 
6. investment (consumer expenditures for dur-
ables, residential construction, nonresidential 
business fixed investment, and change in busi-
ness inventories) 
7. government purchases (federal, state, and 
local) 
8. net exports 
the real GNP supply variables: 
9. hours worked per week in private business 
sector 
10. compensation per hour in private business 
sector 
11. civilian employment 
and a final variable: 
12. the total urban consumer price index (CPI) 
Before applying the VAR model to its assigned 
task, we compiled error statistics to ensure that our 
model was reasonable. The statistics were generated by 
estimating the model over subperiods of the sample 
period and forecasting eight quarters beyond those 
subperiods. Table 2 presents Theil U statistics for 
VAR forecasts and for representative major forecasts.
2 
Lower values of Theil U statistics indicate better fore-
casting performance than higher values. The statistics 
in the table aren't exactly comparable, both because the 
forecasts used different measures of the price level 
(CPI and GNP deflator) and because they were predi-
cated on different data periods. Either of these differ-
Table 2 
Theil U Statistics for VAR Forecasts (1976:1-1978:4) 
and Two Major Forecasts (1970:3-1979:2) 




















VAR (CPI) .259 .268 .241 .196 .159 .161 
DRI (Deflator) .160 .191 .232 .265 .292 .315 
Chase (Deflator) .156 .159 .202 .244 .284 .314 
Key: 0.0 = perfect accuracy 
1.0 = results could be attained by predicting no 
change from current value over the period 
ences would make direct comparisons of the error 
statistics impossible. However, we do interpret the 
similarities among the statistics as implying that this 
VAR model is a reasonable forecasting device. In fact, 
the VAR has better error statistics over horizons of four 
quarters and longer, even though the forecasts from 
Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) and Chase Econ-
ometrics were based on more complete information.
3 
The Initial Forecast: F1 
Initially, the VAR was estimated over the entire period 
from the second quarter of 1958 to the fourth quarter of 
1978 and was used to forecast variables through the 
end of 1980. This forecast, F1, can be thought of as an 
"original best guess" that might have been made at the 
end of 1978 if we had assumed that the economic 
relationships established in the past would hold up in 
the future.
4 Forecast F1 predicted that for the fourth 
2The Theil U statistic is, for a given forecast horizon, the square root of the 
ratio of the sum of squared forecast errors to the sum of squared actual changes. 
Thus, the Theil U is a dimensionless statistic. In McNees 1979, only aggregate 
Theil U statistics, summarizing forecasts over a range of horizons, are given. The 
Theil U statistics for particular horizons were kindly provided to us by McNees. 
3The forecasts from Chase and DRI are based on late-quarter data; when 
their forecasts based on early-quarter data are used, our VAR looks even better. 
4The crucial importance of this assumption is emphasized in Sargent 1979, 
pp. 8 and 13, and in Lucas and Sargent 1979. 
11 quarter of 1979 over the fourth quarter of 1978, real 
GNP would grow by 1.9 percent and inflation, as 
measured by the CPI, would be 8.7 percent.
5 
The Effects of the Oil-Price Shock in 1979: F2 
Changes in the price of oil are captured in this model 
through movements in the energy CPI. In order to 
determine the effects of surprise increases in oil prices 
on our model's forecast, we treated the quarterly 
differences between the VAR forecast of the energy 
CPI and its actual value in the first three quarters of 
1979 as a series of shocks or innovations. By using the 
estimated coefficients in the VAR and information in 
the covariances of the residuals from the model, we 
were able to estimate the likely effects of the energy-
price shocks on the future of all variables in our model. 
The procedure used in this analysis is discussed in the 
Appendix. 
The revisions to F1 resulting from this series of 
shocks in energy prices create a new forecast, F2. The 
difference between F1 and F2, then, is our estimate of 
the effects of the oil-price shock. 
According to the comparison of F2 and F1 in the 
top half of Table 3, the oil-price shock over 1979 
reduced growth in real output by 1.7 percentage points 
and increased the inflation rate by 2.9 percentage 
points. In addition, the federal deficit in calendar year 
1979 tightened significantly in response to the oil-price 
shock, declining by $14.3 billion. 
The Oil-Price Shock and 
the 1979 Forecast Errors: F3 
Forecast errors are the differences between actual and 
predicted values. Our forecast errors for 1979, then, are 
the differences between the F3 projections (our best 
estimate of actual values) and the F1 projections (our 
initial predicted values). The F3 forecast was obtained 
from a reestimated VAR using all available information 
through the first three quarters of 1979 plus an estimate 
of the actual fourth-quarter level of the 4- to 6-month 
commercial paper rate, based on weekly observations 
through the first eleven weeks of the quarter.
6 The 
5This VAR forecast is a bit more pessimistic than that in our winter 1979 
Quarterly Review. One reason is that in this issue Supel interpreted the fall 1978 
policy actions to be an understood change in the policy rule, while the VAR 
interpreted them to be a shock, that is, random drawings under the existing rule. 
An understood change in policy rule can be expected to have a larger price effect 
and a smaller output effect than a policy shock. 
6The data available when these forecasts were made were the first revisions 
to the third-quarter national income accounts data. 
Table 3 
Forecast Errors and the Impact 
of the Oil-Price Shock in 1979 
Percentage Change 
Fourth Quarter Over 






Real  Energy  Deficit  Paper 
Forecast for 1979  GNP  CPI  CPI  M2  ($ Bil.)  Rate (%) 
F2  0.2  11.6  35.9  9.4  -27.9  8.6 
F1  1.9  8.7  10.3  8.6  -42.2  9.7 
Effect of Oil-Price  -1.7  +2.9  +25.6  +0.8  + 14.3  -1.1 
Shock in 1979 
(F2-F1) 
F3  0.5  12.6  42.3  8.0  -13.1  11.0 
F1  1.9  8.7  10.3  8.6  -42.2  9.7 
Forecast Error in  -1.4  +3.9  +32.0  -0.6  +29.1  + 1.3 
1979 (F3 - F1) 
12  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1980 difference between the forecast commercial paper rate 
and the observed rate, which was 2.5 percentage points, 
was imposed on this reestimated VAR as a fourth-
quarter shock independent of any other shocks to the 
model. 
The comparisons in Table 3 support the notion that 
1979 forecast errors were largely attributable to the oil-
price shock. This shock accounts for a significant part 
of the forecast errors for growth in both real output and 
the CPI during 1979. 
However, when the effect of the oil-price shock and 
the forecast errors are compared, there appear to be 
other important shocks in 1979. Among these was the 
tightening of the policy-related variables in F3 relative 
to F2: growth in the money supply was slower while the 
interest rate was higher, and the deficit was smaller. 
The Effects of the Oil-Price Shock 
on the 1980 Forecast 
In 1980, as in 1979, the oil-price shock had an impact 
on our forecast for real GNP and CPI. Our estimates of 
the effects of the oil-price shock on the outlook for 1980 
were obtained by comparing the F2 and F1 forecasts 
for that year. 
Table 4 suggests that over 1980 the oil-price shock 
by itself would not have produced either negative real 
growth or significantly greater inflation. Predicted real 
GNP growth is lower in 1980 by 1.2 percentage points 
because of this shock, but it is still significantly positive. 
Also because of the oil-price shock, inflation in the CPI 
is projected to increase during 1980 by only about 0.5 
percentage points. This result is partly due to the 
model's prediction that oil prices would stabilize in the 
year following the price shock, showing only a 1.6 
percent increase in the energy CPI over 1980. Based on 
past experience, this prediction seems reasonable: oil 
prices did not increase at all in 1975 following their 
quadrupling in 1974. 
The Oil-Price Shock and 
the 1980 Forecast Revisions 
Our latest forecast for 1980, F3, calls for a very small 
decline in real GNP and for continued double-digit 
inflation. It is thus the combination of 1979 oil-price 
increases together with the monetary and fiscal policy 
shocks of 1979 that leads to our pessimistic projections 
for 1980. 
The oil-price shock explains a surprisingly small 
Table 4 
Forecast Revisions and the Impact 
of the Oil-Price Shock in 1980 
Percentage Change 
Fourth Quarter Over 






Real  Energy  Deficit  Paper 
Forecast for 1980  GNP  CPI  CPI  M2  ($ Bil.)  Rate (%) 
F2  2.1  8.4  1.6  8.0  -81.2  6.1 
F1  3.3  7.9  9.6  9.4  -71.8  8.0 
Effect of Oil-Price  -1.2  +0.5  -8.0  -1.4  -9.4  -1.9 
Shock in 1979 
(F2-F1) 
F3  -0.1  11.4  22.1  7.6  -54.5  10.0 
F1  3.3  7.9  9.6  9.4  -71.8  8.0 
Forecast Revisions*  -3.4  +3.5  + 12.5  -1.8  + 17.3  +2.0 
(F3-F1) 
^Combined effects of 1979 data and reestimation of the model 
13 portion of total 1980 forecast revisions. The difference 
between F3 and F1 is the total revision in our forecast 
for 1980, based on new 1979 information and reesti-
mated economic relationships. Table 4 shows that the 
effect of reestimation and of all the new information 
including the oil-price shock (F3 - Fl), clearly, is 
much larger than the effect of the oil-price shock alone 
(F2 - Fl) for virtually all variables. While the total 
revision in real GNP growth is -3.4 percentage points, 
the oil-price shock alone can explain a decline of only 
1.2 percentage points. And while the total revision in 
the CPI rate of inflation is 3.5 percentage points, the 
oil-price shock alone can explain an increase of only 
0.5 percentage points. In the case of most other vari-
ables, the portion of the forecast revisions explained 
directly by the oil-price shock is not large. 
The most obvious effect of new information and 
reestimation is that oil prices are predicted to continue 
their rapid rise throughout 1980. Table 4 shows, for in-
stance, that the 1979 oil-price shock by itself (F2 - F1) 
is projected to lower the rate of increase in energy prices 
by about 8 percentage points through 1980, but the oil-
price shock and all other new information (F3 - Fl), in 
contrast, are projected to speed the rate of increase in 
energy prices by over 12 percentage points.
7 
Did fundamental economic 
relationships change? 
The conclusions of our study so far—that the oil-price 
shock contributed greatly to the 1979 forecast errors 
and that the oil-price shock and policy shocks together 
shaped the outlook for 1980—appear consistent with 
each other. Nevertheless, there are reasons for exercis-
ing caution in drawing these conclusions, for another 
one of our findings casts some doubt on them. 
The validity of our results and conclusions so far 
depends on the reasonableness of the three forecasts. A 
VAR generates reasonable forecasts as long as there 
are no important breaks from the past in economic 
relationships. But if, for example, the fall 1978 policy 
actions constituted an important break in economic 
policy, then all three forecasts, built on the assumption 
that old relationships still hold, may be questionable. 
In fact, the surprisingly large difference between 
the F2 and the F3 forecasts for 1980 suggests that a 
break in past economic relationships is possible. Fur-
thermore, a comparison of the original estimated VAR 
(which gave us Fl and F2) and the reestimated VAR 
(which resulted in F3) also suggests that there were 
significant changes in the estimated coefficients in the 
model. The F2 projections were derived by treating the 
oil-price shock simply as three observations deviating 
randomly from the forecast mean of the original esti-
mated model. If these observations were not random 
shocks but rather were realizations of fundamental 
changes in economic processes, then the coefficients in 
the equations of the model would show significant 
changes. And if the coefficients change significantly, 
of course, then structural change cannot be easily 
dismissed. 
Our sample size makes it impossible to perform a 
rigorous test for structural change. However, the way 
variables in the reestimated VAR responded to shocks 
in the energy CPI did change very clearly over an eight-
quarter horizon from the original estimates of the 
model. This suggests that a structural change is at least 
a possibility. 
Although the differences in the F2 and F3 fore-
casts for 1980 suggest the possibility of a structural 
change, they do not provide clear-cut evidence. In going 
from F2 to F3, we not only reestimated the coefficients 
of the equations in the model, but also added informa-
tion on other variables in addition to the energy CPI. 
The differences between the two forecasts, therefore, 
could be due either to different coefficients or to 
different information sets. 
However, if the differences in the forecasts were 
mainly due to the reestimated coefficients, then it is 
likely that some structural change has occurred. In 
order to isolate the effects of the reestimated coef-
ficients, we must disentangle them from the effects due 
solely to new data. To do this, we conditioned forecasts 
from both estimated versions of the model on the same 
information set. We used data through the third quarter 
of 1979 to generate forecasts for the fourth quarter of 
1979 and for all of 1980. In neither case did we impose 
the interest rate information from the fourth quarter of 
1979. Since the information conditioning the forecasts 
is now the same, any differences must be caused by the 
new coefficients. These two forecasts are compared in 
7One reason for this difference is that the F2 forecast weights most heavily 
the oil-price hikes of 1974, while the reestimated model weights the 1979 rises 
most heavily. Such significant differences in forecast paths for energy prices in 
1980 suggest that there were important differences in the oil-price shocks of 
1974 and 1979. In fact, in 1974 oil prices quadrupled in the first quarter and then 
remained stable, while in 1979 oil prices escalated in each quarter. 
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The Effects of Reestimation on the 1980 Outlook 
Percentage Change Annual Average 
Fourth Quarter Over ^ 
Previous Fourth Quarter Federa| Com| 
Real  Energy  Deficit  Paper 
Forecast for 1980  GNP  CPI  CPI  M2  ($ Bil.)  Rate (%) 
Reestimated VAR  0.3  11.3  20.7  8.0  -53.5  8.2 
Original VAR  1.2  8.0  1.8  8.1  -84.5  7.0 
Difference = Effects  -0.9  +3.3  + 18.9  -0.1  +31.0  + 1.2 
of Reestimation 
Table 5.8 
The effects of reestimation on the 1980 forecasts 
further suggest that 1979 may have been characterized 
by some changed economic relationships. Real output 
and inflation projections again show sizable changes, 
and the reestimated model predicts continued rapid 
increases in energy prices through 1980, while the 
original model shows virtually no change. Reestimation 
also results in a sizable projected tightening in the 1980 
federal budget and in an increase in the average annual 
interest rate. While the evidence suggests that 1979 
may have been characterized by some fundamental 
changes in relationships, it does not pinpoint the source 
of such changes. Either a new energy environment or 
new economic policies could be the source of any 
changes. 
While these observations do not provide rigorous 
or conclusive proof that any sort of structural change in 
economic relationships occurred, they are strongly 
suggestive and should not be dismissed lightly. Should 
such changes have actually occurred, forecasts from 
any model based on macroeconomic relationships, 
including ours, would have to be interpreted with 
caution. 
Summary 
Our VAR model indicates that 1979 forecast errors 
were largely attributable to unexpected increases in oil 
prices during the year. Moreover, monetary and fiscal 
policies turned out to be tighter than historical relation-
ships led us to believe they would be. A reestimated 
VAR, incorporating data through the first three quar-
ters of 1979, suggests that attempts to forecast may 
have been thwarted by some changes in fundamental 
economic relationships. If such changes have occurred, 
then the problems we encountered in forecasting, given 
a policy change, and in predicting responses to a shock, 
given a change in economic relationships, would have 
been encountered no matter what method of inquiry 
was used. 
8The differences in projected growth over the four quarters of 1979 were 
relatively small, since only the fourth quarter was forecast. 
15 Appendix 
The VAR and Impulse Response Functions 
To see how our experiment works, we will characterize 
the VAR in the following way. (A more rigorous 
discussion may be found in Litterman 1979 or in Sargent 
1979.) Let z, be a vector (12 X 1, in this case) of all 
variables in the model at time t. The M
th-order vector 
autoregression (M = 5, in our case) for the z, process is 
(1) zt = Alzt_, + . . . +AMzt_M + el 
wherei4l9... ,AM are (12 X 12) matrices, and where the 
(12 X 1) vector e, is independent of zt_l9... ,zt_M. What 
relation (1) says is that the value of each component of 
z, depends on the history of itself and of every other 
variable in the model plus a contemporaneous random 
component. 
If we solve the system of difference equations (1), 
we arrive at a vector moving average representation 
oo 
(2) z, = 2 C(et_h Co = I 
i=0 
where each C, is (12 X 12) in our model. Now (2) says 
that each component of vector z at time t depends on a 
random shock in that component at time t plus the effects 
of random disturbances in all other variables in previous 
periods. From (1) we know that the random vector et 
is simply the forecast error from a linear least squares 
prediction ofzt based on its own history. Thus, we may 
use (2) to trace out the likely effects of innovations, or 
unexpected shocks, in any one variable in the model on 
the future of all variables in the model, assuming that 
the responses remain the same as they were in the past. 
When used in this way, the sequence of matrices Cb 
C2, . . . in the moving average representation is called 
an impulse response function. (See Sims 1980 or 
Litterman 1979 for a more complete discussion of this 
analytical device.) 
The steps outlined above work fine as long as the 
contemporaneous innovations in different variables are 
independent. But when we want to characterize the 
response of the model to innovations taking into ac-
count nonzero cross covariances, we must normalize the 
model in some way. The method employed here is to 
orthogonalize the errors according to a given ordering of 
the variables. Thus, a lower triangular matrix B0 is found 
which will transform the vector et into a vector u, having 
zero cross covariances, 
ut = B0et. 
Premultiplying all the terms in (1) by B0 leads to the 
representation 
(3) B0zt = B0 Axzt_x + . . . + B0 AMzt_M + B0et 
= Z>1z,_1 + . . . +Dmz,_m + ut 
where D) = B0Aj9j ^ 1. Since B0 is lower triangular, (3) 
says that the first component of z,, zu, depends on the 
history of all variables in the model plus a contem-
poraneous disturbance term. The second component 
z2t depends on the contemporaneous value of zu, the 
history of all variables in the model, and a contempo-
raneous random term. The final component will depend 
not only on the history of, but also on the contempo-
raneous values of, all other variables in the model, as 
well as on its own history. Thus, the use of (3) and of 
the solution to it for determining effects of innovations 
is equivalent to reestimating the VAR allowing con-
temporaneous values of some variables to affect values 
of other variables in a manner reflected in the order of 
the variables and in the triangular characteristics ofi?0. 
In our experiment, the energy CPI was the first 
variable, zlt9 in the orthogonalization order. Thus, it 
was not affected by contemporaneous values of any 
other variable in the model. Following, in order, were 
the commercial paper rate, the deficit, M2, consump-
tion, government purchases, investment, net exports, 
employment, hours, compensation per hour, and the 
16  Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1980 CPI. The first step of the experiment was to take the 
difference between the actual and forecast energy price 
index in 1979:1 as the innovation uu. After the effects 
on all variables of this innovation were taken into 
account, the difference between the new 1979:2 fore-
cast of the energy price index and the actual value was 
imposed as a second shock. The procedure was re-
peated for the third-quarter innovation. The result was 
that we imposed successive innovations in the energy 
price index of 1.2, 5.3, and 5.8 standard deviations 
from the forecast mean in the first three quarters of 
1979. 
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